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Christopher Martin  Master’s Thesis 
Abstract 
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, law enforcement in the United States 
began to employ powers and tactics that infringe upon the civil liberties of the suspects that they 
targeted. Though some of these uses have been challenged and reversed in the courts, there is 
still a portion of the population that believes that tactics like these, even up to torture, have been 
justified to combat terrorism. This study seeks to use General Social Survey data about people’s 
views of the use of expanded police and surveillance powers to combat terrorism to compare 
these with people’s age, sex, race, education, political ideology, and trust in different branches of 
the government. This will improve our understanding of who puts more emphasis on security 
over civil liberties when it comes to terrorist suspects. 
Through this analysis, it is found that political ideology was not as important as was 
thought in the literature. It was found that confidence in the military was the strongest indicator 
of people favoring policies that expanded surveillance and gave increased power to go after 
terrorist suspects. 
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 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and subsequent attacks have made terrorism 
and the response to terrorism a more widely known issue in everyday lives. It has also sparked 
much debate as to the ways in which we should combat these threats and if our current systems 
of law enforcement are capable of handling these types of criminals. Some have called for an 
increase in the powers of the organizations that are tasked with hunting down terrorist suspects, 
allowing them greater abilities to track down people who are suspected of terrorist activity. 
These proposals sometimes come at the cost of the civil liberties of those who are suspected of 
engaging in terrorist activity. 
 September 11, 2001 is a day that no one saw coming. The early morning news reported 
their stories normally and everything seemed to be normal. This all changed in the midmorning 
when the planes began to hit their targets and people were unaware of what was happening. By 
nighttime there were thousands thought dead as a part of the attacks, no one had claimed 
responsibility as of yet and many in the United States were calling for revenge (Barron 2001). 
The president said this in his address to the nation that evening:  
The search is underway for those who were behind these evil acts. I have directed the full 
resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible 
and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who 
committed these acts and those who harbor them (Bush 2001) 
This rhetoric suggests that the United States was prepared to go after people suspected of these 
acts with all of its resources and ability. 
 As part of the fighting and intelligence gathering comes the policy detaining people 
suspected of terrorism and those captured on the battlefield. This new kind of war has presented 
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the United States with a unique problem when it comes to detainment of the prisoners of war. In 
previous wars, those that had a declared start and an expected end of hostilities, prisoners would 
be exchanged at the end of hostilities and then go home (Savage 2018). This is not the case when 
you are not fighting a nation and there is no one to formally surrender. This has led to an issue 
where there is no clear way to release prisoners because it is feared by many that they will join 
new groups when released, but there is not enough evidence (or the evidence would not stand up 
in court) to convict these prisoners in a civilian court. There has been a shift in recent years to 
trying these people in a criminal court to get more stable convictions, but there are still some 
detainees who the United States must come up with another solution for. 
 Another policy that was implemented by the United States was the usage of “enhanced 
interrogation” techniques to gain information from prisoners, these techniques have been 
described as torture, and included things such as waterboarding, shackling detainees in 
uncomfortable positions, and keeping them awake for days at a time (Johnson, Mora, and 
Schmidt 2016). These techniques not only had debated efficacy in terms of gaining information, 
but they also hurt the United States internationally as some other nations did not trust the United 
States’ detention of prisoners and the rhetoric of terrorists began to emphasize these techniques 
in their recruitment. Some CIA operatives and high-ranking officials in the Bush administration, 
including the former president, face potential legal issues if they travel to countries that have 
open investigations into these actions (Johnson, Mora, and Schmidt 2016). 
Despite this, support for these programs has remained popular, with about half of the 
country believing that torture can be justified when going after terrorist suspects, and U.S. 
President Donald Trump has stated that he believes that torture works. This would imply that 
there is something less tangible that is leading to people to show support for more extreme 
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measures when it comes to terrorist suspects. This support tends to follow along partisan lines, 
with republicans supporting greater powers to go after terrorists. Is this all that is going on here, 
or are there other variables, such as trust or race that are affecting these opinions? 
 This study seeks to examine the popularity of programs, such as surveillance and 
detention, in the general public using GSS data collected in 2016 in order to answer these 
questions. Additionally, these variables will also be examined while looking at the political 
ideology of the people who hold these beliefs, and their views on the government in order to 
understand what may contribute to these differing opinions.  
 I begin with a review of the literature that examines the various laws and policies that 
have been enacted by the United States and some other countries that have expanded police 
powers when it comes to terrorism and some opinion numbers about these policies. I then briefly 
discuss my methods. After this I go through the data by each individual variable before a 
multiple regression to see which is most correlated. This analysis aimed at answering the 
questions of: does how political views correlate with views on anti-terror and surveillance 
policies? And how does trust in the different parts of the government correlate with views on 




USA PATRIOT ACT and the FISA Court 
The groundwork for United States law on how to respond to terrorist acts and terrorist 
suspects in the wake of the September 11 attacks is the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. The Patriot 
Act greatly expands the capacity of government agents to collect information from records of all 
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kinds including business, school and library records in Article V by expanding FBI ability to get 
these records so long as it is not based on activity protected by the first amendment; and by 
amending the General Education Provisions Act and the National Education Statistics Act of 
1994 so that disclosures can be made to the Attorney General for Terror suspects (USA 
PATRIOT Act, 115 Stat. 272 2001). The government attempted to frame the act as being good 
for both liberty and security. The logic of the government was that security is necessary for 
liberty and that terrorists act to threaten security (Pikowsky 2002). This logic goes further to say 
that because the Patriot Act attempts to stop these terrorists and create greater security, it 
therefore fosters greater levels of liberty (Simone 2009). 
The Patriot Act also greatly expanded the FISA (Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act) 
courts by adding new judges, some of these judgers were required to be in Washington D.C. so 
that they could be more easily reached by government agencies. It also lifted restrictions on 
requirements for surveillance warrants from the court (Pikowsky 2002). The FISA courts, as 
originally constructed by their 1978 establishing law, were designed to allow for the legal 
intelligence gathering from foreign entities or the agents of these entities by agents of the United 
States government. The court was given this specific purpose as it was supposed to distinguish 
between this information being used for “foreign intelligence purposes” and not for “law 
enforcement purposes” (Funk 2007). Surveillance that was to be conducted under the umbrella of 
foreign intelligence has less protections and therefore fewer legal requirements for these 
warrants.  
Since the Patriot Act’s passing, FISA courts have greater range to allow for roving 
surveillance and the standards of the court for granting surveillance have been lowered. Another 
notable change to the ways the FISA courts are used is that it had become acceptable to use 
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information gathered by a FISA warrant in a criminal court so long as intelligence was the 
primary purpose of the surveillance when the criminal evidence was obtained (Henderson 2002). 
This has led to a greater use of the FISA courts as a general tool to pursue terror suspects. There 
are still some restrictions on the surveillance authorizations, US citizens have a higher bar to 
clear when getting a FISA authorization (Johnson 2008). The FISA courts expansion are an 
increase in surveillance that has come about in the wake of September 11. 
 
General Surveillance 
The FISA courts do not represent the only ways in which the federal government has 
increased their surveillance since 2001. With the rise in the use of social media, there are a host 
of companies collecting data from those sites. The government can use this data to track people 
and movements that form on social media (Scott 2017). This collection of data is perfectly legal 
since the people are sharing it willingly and with no reasonable expectation of privacy once it is 
posted on these sites. As a result of this, the government has justified the use of this data to track 
movements such as Black Lives Matter and to track individuals they deem dangerous (Scott 
2017).  
This increased level of surveillance has also been seen in areas that have traditionally 
been given greater protections under the law. In late October of 2001, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft issued an order that allowed for the monitoring of attorney-client conversations of those 
incarcerated if there is a “reasonable suspicion” that this communication will lead to further acts 
of terror (Pogdor and Hall 2003). This surveillance requires a court order and notification of both 
parties of this surveillance taking place. Regardless of this requirement, some defense attorneys 
were upset by this new rule as they saw it as infringing on a fundamental part of communication 
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and that it would lead to less communication after the notification is received (Pogdor and Hall 
2003). Pogdor and Hall concluded that even though these restrictions were short lived, such 
actions would have a chilling effect on lawyers’ willingness to take on terror cases. 
These increases to surveillance programs are only a part of the government’s powers that 
have been exercised in the wake of the September 11 attack. The government began to define 
fighting terrorists using the terminology of war. This so called “war on terror” is the rationale for 
this increased surveillance on people who were seen as combatants. This logic made civil 
liberties for terrorist suspects a “luxury” that could not be afforded to those who sought to attack 
the United States (Baker 2003). Attorney General Ashcroft continued this logic by suggesting 
that people who were concerned over the civil liberties of terrorist suspects were treasonous 
(Braml 2003). Baker found that this logic has led to some practices that substantially limited the 
rights of those accused of terrorism. Additionally, the perception of people of Middle Eastern 
descent as being terrorists has led to more racial profiling (Baker 2003; Lobel 2002). 
One form of surveillance that has been expanded in the wake of the terror attacks of the 
21st century is the use of CCTV cameras in public spaces. Hempel and Topfor (2009) examined 
this expansion in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. They found that all of these 
countries passed laws that expanded the CCTV network and made it easier for law enforcement 
to tap into. It was framed by the government as being a necessary step to keep the public safe 
(Hempel and Topfor 2009) 
 Another area of surveillance that was expanded upon was the capacity of governments to 
collect data on internet usage. This expansion has been additionally augmented by the 
information sharing that goes on between countries, allowing for tracking of people’s activity 
(Brown and Korff 2009). With the close-knit and highly cooperative nature in Europe this has 
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especially been the case there as they are very willing to share this information between agencies 
of different nations (Brown and Korff 2009) 
 
Court Responses 
This expansion has largely been spearheaded by the executive branch in the United 
States. De Londras and Davis (2010) found that laws like the USA PATRIOT Act gave the 
executive agencies the powers that they deemed necessary to fight the war on terror. 
Additionally, De Londras and Davis (2010) also found that the executive branch claimed that the 
courts did not have the authority to interfere with detentions of terrorist suspects as it fell under 
the President’s war powers. 
The courts did not agree that they could not review the methodology of the executive 
branch to fight terrorism, and this led to decisions like the Hamdi and Rasul cases. In Rasul v. 
Bush (2004), a group of detainees from Kuwait were sent to Guantanamo Bay for detention. 
Three detainees, including Shafiq Rasul, filed for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court to have 
their detention declared unconstitutional. Their detention was upheld by the district court and the 
circuit court, citing that they did not have jurisdiction in these cases. The supreme court 
disagreed and ruled that detainees in Guantanamo Bay have the ability to challenge their 
detention there.  
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), Yaser Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan and was 
classified as an “enemy combatant” for allegedly taking up arms against the United States and 
joining the Taliban. This designation allowed Hamdi to be subject to a military tribunal and 
military law despite being an American citizen. Due to this, Hamdi was held for two years 
without charge and the lower courts deferred to the executive’s perspective that the authorization 
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of the use of force in Afghanistan was sufficient to justify both the detention and Hamdi’s enemy 
combatant designation. The Supreme Court overturned the lower courts and held that being 
labeled enemy combatant was not sufficient to remove Hamdi’s ability to contest his detention.  
The lower courts seemed to be unaffected by the changes to the laws that came about 
after the September 11 attacks. Shortell and Smith (2005) found that federal cases against 
terrorism in their data set, pre-9/11 86% of outcomes were favorable to the prosecution and post-
9/11 81% were favorable to the prosecution. Shortell and Smith (2005) concluded from this 
figure that there had been no significant change in the likelihood that terrorists would be ruled 
against in the courts. 
Having an independent judiciary is linked to having lower levels of terrorist actions 
(Findley and Young 2011); and while the favoring of prosecution in criminal cases has remained 
unchanged (Shortell and Smith 2005), the judiciary has frequently deferred to the executive 
branch’s assertions on cases. Banks and Tauber (2014) found that district judges deferred to the 
executive’s opinions in 3/5 of the cases before them concerning terrorism and surveillance under 
the Patriot Act. This deference is also linked to several other variables in the parties in the court 
and the other branches of government. Banks and Tauber found that while the ideology of the 
judge did not impact decisions; when the senate was more conservative, the judiciary was more 
willing to defer to their opinions in civil liberties cases. 
 
Rally Around the Flag Effect 
The September 11 attacks created a surge of public support for the United States 
government’s responses to security issues and going after the terrorists. This “rally around the 
flag” effect saw Americans united against a common threat and in fear of potentially more 
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attacks (Huddy, Feldman, and Weber 2007; Ojeda 2016; Cole, Kincaid, and Parkin 2002). This 
is explained by the salience of terrorism becoming higher to many Americans after seeing the 
September 11 attacks and wanting to have security from future attacks (Deflem and McDonough 
2015). Terrorism was brought into the public’s view by the attack and raised the public support 
for programs to help to find and prevent future terrorist attacks (Deflem and McDonough 2015; 
Haggerty and Gazso 2005; Lewis 2005). This increased public support for the government and 
these policies quickly waned after the September 11 (Ojeda 2016; Deflem and McDonough 
2015). Within three months of the attack, confidence in the government was at 68% and people 
willing to investigate threats regardless of privacy concerns was at 77%. These figures dropped 
to 45% confidence and 66% willing to investigate after the two-year mark (McArdle et al 2012).  
The “rally around the flag” effect is found not only in the United States after 9/11, but in 
the wake of other attacks that have happened since the September 11 attacks in other places. This 
was found to be the case with the 3/11 attack in Madrid orchestrated by an Al-Qaeda inspired 
cell on March 11, 2004(Dinesen and Jaeger 2013) The cell attacked the Madrid commuter rail 
system, killing 191 and wounding approximately 2,000. Dinesen and Jaeger found that there was 
a surge in public support for the government in Spain after this attack, but that increased public 
support returned to normal levels within a few months after the attack. In the weeks before the 
attack trust in the Spanish national government was at 43% among Spanish citizens. This figure 
went up to 58% in the immediate aftermath of the attack, but it was back to 43% at about a year 
after the attack.  
 
Public Opinion of Anti-Terror Policies 
Christopher Martin  Master’s Thesis 
10 
 
increase in trust may be one of several explanations in the wake of the 9/11 attack. 
Chanley (2002) finds that an increase in interest in international relations leads to a greater trust 
in the government. Chanley found this by controlling for the other variables in her study, such as 
presidential approval and consumer sentiment, and the relationship between interest in 
international relationship. Chanley uses this to explain part of why the trust in government may 
have increased in the wake of the September 11 attack, it brought international issues into the 
lives of many people. Another potential link is the salience of an issue, how much a person feels 
that this issue directly affects them, and their trust in the government in this area. Hetherington 
and Husser found that the trust in the government in the area of defense correlates with more 
mentions of defense issues in their content analysis from 1980-2004. They found a similar 
correlation when looking at aid to blacks in terms of a similar content analysis looking for 
references to black issues instead of defense issues. A similar conclusion was found in the study 
by Robinson et al, where they examined the trust in specifically the Department of Homeland 
Security and not the government at large. They found that attention paid to terrorism and the 
DHS was correlated to giving the DHS a higher score for satisfaction.  
It is worth noting that public opinion on investigation policies of the United States in 
general and the Patriot Act specifically has been difficult to fully understand. This is likely 
because of both secrecy on the part of the government in these policies and the perceived 
popularity behind them (Stoycheff 2016; Best and McDermott 2007; Sagar 2009). Sagar finds 
that the classified nature of these laws creates an asymmetry between what the public knows is 
being done and what the government is actually doing. This asymmetry allows for them to 
remove safeguards normally in these programs, making them broader and more invasive than 
they outwardly appear (Sagar 2009). This lack of information makes it more difficult to get 
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correct information on people’s opinions on an issue. Best and McDermott found that when there 
is insufficient information on a subject, the questions that are asked in surveys may have a 
greater effect in swaying people’s responses. They found that when people were given a general 
description of the Patriot Act, they supported it at a rate of 62%, as opposed to more narrow 
description of the act’s provisions such as the ability to search home without notification at 40 % 
and searches of records without notification at 53%. In addition to the secrecy, there was a lack 
of willingness to go against the majority when voicing opinions on surveillance policy. Stoycheff 
(2016) found that when a person’s opinion on surveillance policy was different from the 
perceived majority, they were less likely to voice this opinion when talking in online forums. She 
also found that people were not more likely to speak out against this surveillance even if they 
know that it is happening and they feel it is unjust. These factors make it difficult to fully 
understand what the actual public opinion on the use of these policies actually is. 
 This change in the public’s opinion has several different explanations. One explanation 
for this is that in times where there is a security crisis a “center-right” consensus forms. Pantazis 
and Pemberton (2012) examined UK politics in the twenty-first century and found that two-
thirds of the British population were supportive of the new anti-terror laws passed by the 
conservative parliament and 73% said that it is right to lose some civil liberties in order to 
improve security. Another explanation links support for these policies with the levels of 
authoritarianism in individuals (Hetherington and Suhay 2011). Using a measure that 
Hetherington and Suhay (2011) developed from answers to questions such as “is it more 
important for children to have: ‘Obedience vs. self-reliance’, ‘being considerate vs. being well-
behaved’, etc.” linking the ideals of have a well-ordered society with authoritarianism. This 
measure was checked against other measures on the survey such as support for warrantless 
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wiretaps, support for media censorship, oppose criticizing the president, among other things. 
Hetherington and Suhay (2011) found that the authoritarian views correlated with the increased 
support for policies that reduce civil liberties.  
 Another explanation for this shift in public opinion is that there has been a shift in the 
views on civil liberties in general when it comes to criminals. Terrorism is one of several serious 
crimes which is being considered for this exception and does not have a specific exemption for 
civil liberties of the accused (Mondak and Hurwitz 2012). When it comes to terrorism: 35.7% of 
people favor or strongly favor removing the need for warrants for searches of suspects homes, 
46.7% favor or strongly favor compelling testimony, and 33.8% of people favor or strongly favor 
indefinite pre-trial detention for suspects. This compared to people’s views on serious crimes: 
28.2% of people favor or strongly favor removing the need for warrants for searches of suspects 
homes, 36% favor or strongly favor compelling testimony, and 26.3% of people favor or strongly 
favor indefinite pre-trial detention for suspects (Mondak and Hurwitz 2012). Mondak and 
Hurwitz found that for two-thirds of people who support civil liberty exemptions for terrorist 
suspects, this is not an exclusive view about terrorism, but is actually their view on how suspects 
of serious crimes in general should be handled. 
Many of the policies and increased policing that have gone on in the wake of the 
September 11 attack have been perceived by people of Arab American and Muslim communities 
to be targeting these groups (Sun, Wu, and Poteyeva 2011; Cherney and Murphy 2013). Sun, Wu 
and Poteyeva examined the opinions in the Arab American community of the programs used to 
combat terrorism. They found that Arab Americans had a low level of support for police 
programs, 52% were in favor of surveillance of the general public, 23% were in favor of 
allowing police to stop and search members of the general public, and 19% were in favor of 
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detaining someone who seemed suspicious even if there was no actual evidence; they also asked 
these same questions if these programs were targeted against Arab Americans and the percentage 
of those in favor dropped to 15% for surveillance, 7% for stop and search and 12% for detaining 
someone suspicious. Additionally, both Sun et al, and Cherney and Murphy found that there is a 
strong correlation between support for these laws in Arab American communities and the 
perceived legitimacy of the laws and the law enforcement. 
 This shifting view of civil liberties that affect privacy concerns may be shifting as a result 
of changing societal norms. Swigger (2013) examines how the rise of social media platforms 
contributes to shifting views on certain civil liberties. He examines how social media may have 
shifted the views on both privacy concerns as well as free speech concerns as he hypothesizes 
that these platforms put high value on expression over privacy. Swigger separates out 
respondents by age; under 25, and 25 and over; and uses this as a measure of people who have 
learned socialization skills in the age of the internet and social media. Swigger does find that 
there is a strong correlation (p<.05) for lack of support for privacy and for support of freedom of 
speech. Swigger notes that this shift could be caused by other factors as it is not an exact 
measure of social media socialization, but it is evident that there is a shift in these views based 
on age. 
 The regards for civil liberties also cut across ideological and racial dividing lines. Davis 
and Silver (2004) examine how political ideology and race affect people’s views on civil liberties 
when they are concerned about another terror attack. The general trend is that when people are 
less concerned about a terrorist attack, they are more pro-civil liberties. This breaks out even 
further as people who are liberal tend to be more concerned for civil liberties at all levels of 
concern than conservatives, usually at about a 9 percentage-point difference (No concern about 
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an attack:78% pro-civ. lib. among liberals and 69% pro-civ. lib. among conservatives. Very 
concerned: for liberals and 45% for conservative). Additionally, among different racial groups 
there is also a difference in concern. Davis and Silver found that overall African Americans are 
the most concerned about civil liberties and that Latinos and Whites concerns over civil liberties 
reach a similar percentage as concern over an attack gets higher (not at all concerned: 74% for 
African Americans, 72% for Latinos, and 63% for Whites. Very concerned: 64% for African 
Americans, and 48% for both Latinos and Whites). 
 In order to gain more information on terrorist attacks and terrorist activities, the United 
States government would employ tactics known as enhanced interrogation techniques, some of 
which included torture (Liberman 2014). Gronke et al (2010) find that support for torture did not 
reach favorable levels until 2009 and not at all for some of the harsher techniques. Gronke et al 
shows that it was not until April 2009 that people who favored torture outnumbered those who 
opposed it (49% favored, 47% opposed) and this number kept growing until the end of the 
studies’ numbers in November of 2009. Additionally, Gronke et al explains why there is often a 
misconception of how many people actually support torture. They explain that people have a 
tendency to overestimate their own viewpoint on torture, the more they support it. They found 
that people who say torture is often justified, who make up 15% of the population, on average 
say that about a third of the population agrees with them; people who say that torture is 
sometimes justified, 30% of people, on average say that about 62 % agree with their position, 
and people who are opposed to torture tend to have a good gauge of where people actually stand 
on the issue. Another interesting note in Gronke et al is that in a survey conducted in 2006 
among Marine and Army soldiers, they were overall opposed to torture, even if it will save the 
life of a fellow soldier (56 % oppose in the marines, 59% oppose in the army). 





This study uses General Social Survey (GSS) data from 2016 to see if these correlation 
between these data points. I use SPSS to run the analyses on the data in this study. The main data 
points that are used deal with the government using certain powers when going after terrorist 
suspects. The question asked in the GSS is: “suppose the government suspected a terrorist act 
was about to happen. Do you think the authorities should have the right to: detain people for as 
long as they want without putting them on trial (wotrial), tap people’s phone conversations 
(tapphone), and stop and search people in the street at random (stoprndm)?” Additionally, I use 
data aimed at seeing people’s opinions about whether the government should have the ability to 
surveil citizens in their everyday lives. The variables that are used for this are: “Do you think that 
the American government should or should not have the right to do the following? Monitor e-
mails and any other information exchanged on the Internet? (emonitor), keep people under video 
surveillance in public areas? (cctv), collect information about anyone living in America without 
their knowledge? (givinfusa), and collect information about anyone living in other countries 
without their knowledge? (givinffor)”. These dependent variables will illustrate public opinion 
about whether the government should have the power to conduct blanket surveillance of citizens 
and if the government should be able to use increased power to pursue terrorist suspects. 
These variables will be run firstly against descriptive variables such as respondent’s age 
(age); respondent’s race (race), defined by a self-report of white, black, and other; respondent’s 
sex (sex), defined as a self-report of male and female; and respondent’s degree (degree), defined 
by the respondent’s highest degree earned. These variables represent general demographic data 
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and running a linear regression with these variables and the dependent variables is a good place 
to get a basic understanding of who may support these polices. 
 After doing this analysis I examine the dependent variables by running a regression of 
different independent variables. The first of these variables is aimed at people’s political 
ideologies. The question in the GSS data is: “I am going to show you a seven-point scale on 
which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal--point 1--to 
extremely conservative--point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale? (polviews). This 
will show if these opinions trend with a certain political ideology.” 
The next variables run are meant to see if people have confidence in the various federal 
institutions who would have a role to play in going after terrorist suspects. This data is in the 
GSS as: I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these 
institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some 
confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? This question is asked about the following 
parts of the government: Executive branch of the federal government (confed), U.S. supreme 
court (conjudge), Congress (conlegis), and military (conarmy). 
The final set variables I will run in this analysis is aimed at measuring people’s trust in 
politicians and administrators. These variables are in the GSS as: How much do you agree or 
disagree with each of the following statements? People we elect to Congress try to keep the 
promises they have made during the election (poleff16), and Most government administrators 
can be trusted to do what is best for the country (poleff17).  
The independent variables in this study look at people’s political ideology, how much 
trust people have in the different branches of government, and how much trust they have in the 
people who run the government. These variables will give insight into whether political ideology 
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and perception of government affect if Americans believe the government should use extra 
powers against terrorist suspects. 
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18-24 227 7.9 7.9 7.9
25-34 510 17.8 17.9 25.8
35-44 481 16.8 16.8 42.6
45-54 489 17.1 17.1 59.7
55-64 533 18.6 18.7 78.4
65-74 356 12.4 12.5 90.9
75 and up 261 9.1 9.1 100.0
Total 2857 99.7 100.0










WHITE 2100 73.2 73.2 73.2
BLACK 490 17.1 17.1 90.3
OTHER 277 9.7 9.7 100.0








MALE 1276 44.5 44.5 44.5
FEMALE 1591 55.5 55.5 100.0










328 11.4 11.5 11.5
HIGH 
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1461 51.0 51.1 62.6
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216 7.5 7.6 70.1
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536 18.7 18.7 88.9
GRADUAT
E
318 11.1 11.1 100.0
Total 2859 99.7 100.0
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303 10.6 22.2 42.9
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General Social Survey 
 The General Social Survey is a survey of adults conducted by the National Opinion 
Research Center at the University of Chicago. This survey consists of interviewers going out and 
interviewing people in different regions of the United States, in an effort to get a representative 
sample of the United States’ population. The Survey consists of a number of core questions they 
ask every two years when it is conducted as well as questions selected for that particular round of 
surveys. Additionally, some of the questions in the survey are not asked of the whole group in 
order to streamline the questions that the interviewers need to ask but are separated evenly 
among different groups of those taking the survey. The survey is given to several thousand 
respondents so that the results can be generalized to the population at large. I opted to use this 
data set as it is a dataset that is good for generalizability in both the number of respondents and 
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United States and the 2016 data set had several questions on police powers and trust that I 
wanted to examine further in this context. 
 
Limitations 
The major limitation of this study is the use of GSS Data for the analyses. This data was 
very useful to conduct the analysis but was still beholden to the data gathered by another service 
and forced to work within the constraints of the variables and categories that they had created. 
Additionally, due to the methodology of the way that this data is collected there were some 
variables that did not have many respondents, such as the one that measured if people trusted 
congresspeople to keep their promises, meant that when checked against the test variables there 
were not enough respondents in some answer categories to do proper analysis. Some of these 
variables (the ones examining peoples trust in government administrators and trust in members 
of congress to try to keep their promises) were collapsed in an effort to do the analysis, but in 
doing so some of the detail may have been lost. This lack of respondents in these variables may 





Table 1-Age and Powers 
Variable Chi-Square Sig (α=.05) 
STOPRNDM 21.413 0.259 
TAPPHONE 43.402 0.001* 
WOTRIAL 19.609 0.355 
CCTV 23.216 0.182 
EMONITOR 27.898 0.064 
Christopher Martin  Master’s Thesis 
22 
 
GIVINFUSA 36.403 0.006* 
GIVINFFOR 81.206 0.000* 
 
 When examining these variables in terms of the age of the respondents there is a general 
trend among respondents that the younger they are the higher the percentage of them believe the 
government should not have these powers, and the lower the percentage of people who believe 
the government definitely should not have these powers. This relationship seems to show that the 
powers being used by the government are less popular among people who are younger. This 
trend does not show that as people age, the percentage of them who believe that the government 
should or should not have these powers varies. These relationships may also be coincidental. The 
only variables that show statistical significance are should the government be allowed to tap a 
terrorist suspect’s phone conversation and if the government should be allowed to collect info on 
United States citizens and foreigners without their knowledge. This may show that, with the 
exception of the youngest age block (18-24) that age is not an indicator of if people feels that the 
government should have these increased powers. 
 
Sex 
Table 2-Sex and Powers 
Variable Chi-Square Sig (α=.05) 
STOPRNDM 1.809 0.613 
TAPPHONE 0.334 0.954 
WOTRIAL 9.671 0.022* 
CCTV 12.880 0.005* 
EMONITOR 0.594 0.898 
GIVINFUSA 1.660 0.646 
GIVINFFOR 11.060 0.011* 
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Several variables for sex show statistical significance, but these variables do not show a 
great variation in the numbers. For most of the variables the percentages are similar in terms of 
what powers they feel that the government should and should not have. The exceptions to this 
are the views on if the government should be allowed to detain suspects without a trial and if the 
government should be allowed to collect information on foreigners without the individual’s 
knowledge. When it comes to detaining suspects without trial females tend to be more in favor of 
these policies, and males are more likely to be in favor of collecting data on foreigners. Both of 
these variables have statistical significance but conducting surveillance in public places also has 
some variance and statistical significance. This difference can be seen more so in how strongly 
the different sexes feel about these policies. More females feel that the government should 
definitely have this power than do males, however, more males feel the government should 
probably have these powers than do females. When both categories are taken together, they equal 
a similar percentage (64.8% for males and 64.7% for females) are in favor of this policy. This 
may indicate that the only difference that exists between male and female respondents is 
generally the strength of their beliefs and not any difference in whether they agree or disagree. 
 
Race 
Table 3-Race and Powers 
Variable Chi-Square Sig (α=.05) 
STOPRNDM 16.607 0.011* 
TAPPHONE 12.970 0.044* 
WOTRIAL 14.596 0.024* 
CCTV 8.533 0.202 
EMONITOR 6.937 0.327 
GIVINFUSA 5.614 0.468 
GIVINFFOR 18.456 0.005* 
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 Race has an unexpected outcome to it. For the questions of if the government should be 
allowed to stop suspects on the street and search them, and if the government should be allowed 
to tap the phones of suspects; the data follows the anticipated trend where black people are less 
in favor of giving extra powers to the government that may infringe upon people’s civil liberties. 
Black people are, however, more likely to support detaining suspects indefinitely without trial 
than white people, though a majority of both black and white people believe that the government 
either definitely should not or probably should not have this power. This policy is also 
unexpected for the “other” category for race as for this power given to the government there is a 
rise in support for detainment over the other policies. The “other” category for race has their 
highest percentage in this category in the people who definitely support this, and they have the 
closest thing to a majority who feel that the government should have this power (combined 
percentage of 48.5% who think that the government definitely should or probably should have 
this power). This category is difficult to analyze as it is a combination of all people who identify 
as neither black nor white, and so there is no way to know if this is a trend in a specific group or 
just a quirk of the subgroups that create this category. Another category that has statistical 
significance when examined using race is if the government should be allowed to collect 
information on foreigners without notifying them. Black people are more in favor of this kind of 
policy being in place when compared to the other categories on race. This may show that the 
priority for black people in defense of civil liberties may be things that affect them and so when 
it is collection of information of foreign citizens, they prioritize security since it is not their 
information that is being collected. 
 
Degree 
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Table 4-Degree and Powers 
Variable Chi-Square Sig (α=.05) 
STOPRNDM 19.032 0.088 
TAPPHONE 28.033 0.005* 
WOTRIAL 29.329 0.004* 
CCTV 25.352 0.013* 
EMONITOR 24.122 0.020* 
GIVINFUSA 19.671 0.074 
GIVINFFOR 39.453 0.000* 
 
 The education level of respondents generally follows the trend of having people who are 
more educated being less in favor of these policies that expand the government’s power. The 
largest jump in support seems to be between people who have less than a high school degree and 
people who have a high school degree or more. Another quirk of this data is that there tends to be 
a slight jump in support among people with bachelor’s degrees when compared to people with 
junior college and graduate degrees. The one category where this does not seem to be the case is 
if the government should be allowed to conduct video surveillance in public places. When it 
comes to this policy, the opposite tends to be true where the percentage of people who support it 
goes up with levels of education of the respondent. 
 
Political Ideology 
Table 5-Political Ideology and Powers 
Variable Chi-Square Sig (α=.05) 
STOPRNDM 24.074 0.001* 
TAPPHONE 7.099 0.312 
WOTRIAL 31.325 0.000* 
CCTV 1.198 0.977 
EMONITOR 14.707 0.023* 
GIVINFUSA 13.498 0.036* 
GIVINFFOR 17.015 0.009* 
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 In terms of respondent’s political ideology, this variable behaved exactly as anticipated. 
People who identified themselves as more liberal across all of the different variables were 
consistently less in favor of any of these measures. As well as people who identified as 
conservative tended to be those most in favor of these kinds of powers being granted to the 
government. It is also worthy of noting that the people who self-identified as moderate tended to 
be closer to the people who self-identified as conservative in the policies that they were asked 
about. This not only shows that conservative individuals are more in favor of these security 
policies, but also that when it comes to this issue, people who identify as centrists are closer to 
the conservative block. This may be why there was such support as people trended towards being 
in favor of these policies between the conservative and moderate blocks. 
 
Trust in Administrators and Congress to Keep Promises 
Table 6-Trust in Administrators and Powers 
Variable Chi-Square Sig (α=.05) 
STOPRNDM 6.800 0.340 
TAPPHONE 15.813 0.015* 
WOTRIAL 31.554 0.035* 
CCTV 27.275 0.000* 
EMONITOR 22.313 0.001* 
GIVINFUSA 18.448 0.005* 
GIVINFFOR 4.184 0.652 
 
Table 7-Trust in Congress to Keep Promises 
and Powers 
Variable Chi-Square Sig (α=.05) 
STOPRNDM 21.013 0.002* 
TAPPHONE 5.283 0.508 
WOTRIAL 6.425 0.377 
CCTV 9.263 0.159 
EMONITOR 12.207 0.058 
GIVINFUSA 18.037 0.006* 
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GIVINFFOR 6.586 0.361 
 
 The first two variables that are aimed at examining how people’s trust in the government 
(that most government administrators can be trusted, and that people elected to congress try to 
keep their promises) effects the powers that the government should be given against terrorist 
suspects and for general surveillance followed a general trend without any outliers. This trend is 
that people who had trust in administrators and congress to keep their promise were more willing 
to grant these powers than did people who did not. Those who did not have an opinion on if they 
trusted government in these ways tended to fall in between support from those who agreed and 
disagreed, but there did not seem to be any trend to these points otherwise. This may be because 
they see the administrators as the ones who were enforcing the policy and so when people have 
trust in the administrators, they are more willing to support the policies. 
 
Confidence in Military 
Table 8-Confidence in Military and Powers 
Variable Chi-Square Sig (α=.05) 
STOPRNDM 17.961 0.006* 
TAPPHONE 22.533 0.001* 
WOTRIAL 27.235 0.000* 
CCTV 8.272 0.219 
EMONITOR 15.834 0.015* 
GIVINFUSA 28.864 0.000* 
GIVINFFOR 19.897 0.003* 
 
When it comes to how much confidence people have in the military, this data follows a 
similar trend to those examining trust in the government, with those with greater trust in the 
military believing that these powers should be granted to the government in a higher percentage 
than those without confidence in the military. One thing that is interesting is in the way these 
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numbers go down as people’s confidence in the military goes down for the questions on granting 
powers to pursue terrorist suspects specifically. Overall, there is less in the total for people who 
feel the government definitely should and probably should have these powers; but people with 
only some confidence in the military see a steep decline in the percentage for both of these 
variables. For people who have hardly any confidence in the military the decline continues in the 
category of probably should not have, however there is an increase in the number of people who 
believe the government definitely should have these powers. This steep decline is also not 
present when comparing confidence in the military to any of the other variables in this analysis. 
These other variables did follow the general trend that as the confidence in the military went 
down, the belief that the government should have these powers also went down. This is likely 
similar to the trust in administrators, people see the military as likely the ones enforcing some of 
these policies and so when people have more confidence in the military. This may also explain 
why the variables on powers to go after terrorist suspects specifically have the steepest decline, 
as these may be the power people associate with the military the most. 
 
Confidence in the Executive 
Table 9-Confidence in the Executive and 
Powers 
Variable Chi-Square Sig (α=.05) 
STOPRNDM 4.011 0.675 
TAPPHONE 2.249 0.895 
WOTRIAL 5.739 0.453 
CCTV 7.705 0.261 
EMONITOR 8.117 0.230 
GIVINFUSA 4.169 0.654 
GIVINFFOR 20.545 0.002* 
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 The analysis that examined confidence in the executive branch showed that with most of 
the variables, there is no significance between confidence in the executive and the variables 
examined. The exception to this is if the government should be allowed to collect information on 
foreigners. This data also does something unexpected where the overall percentage of people 
who believe that the government should have this power goes down from people with a great 
deal of confidence in the executive and people who have only some confidence in the executive. 
For people who have hardly any confidence in the executive, these percentages are higher than 
where they were for people who have a great deal of trust in the executive. This may show that 
people who do not have a strong opinion on the executive may not have a strong opinion when it 
comes to these policies as well. 
 
Confidence in Legislature 
Table 10-Confidence in the Legislature and 
Powers 
Variable Chi-Square Sig (α=.05) 
STOPRNDM 4.494 0.610 
TAPPHONE 10.003 0.125 
WOTRIAL 8.641 0.195 
CCTV 12.776 0.047* 
EMONITOR 4.796 0.570 
GIVINFUSA 9.042 0.171 
GIVINFFOR 18.630 0.005* 
 
 When it comes to confidence in the legislature, it is very similar to the breakdown in 
confidence in the executive. The only variables with statistical significance are if the government 
should be allowed to collect information on foreigners and if the government should be allowed 
to conduct video surveillance in public areas. For the video surveillance variable, the only shift is 
in the number of respondents who say that the government definitely should and probably should 
Christopher Martin  Master’s Thesis 
30 
 
have this power, the overall approval percentage remains the same. For the collection of 
information of foreigners, it follows the same trend as the executive where it dips between 
people with a great deal of confidence in the legislature and those with only some, and then 
raises to its highest level with those with hardly any confidence in the legislature. This may show 
that when it comes to gathering information on foreigners, the legislature is not the branch that 
people think are the ones in charge of this gathering and so they do not need to have confidence 
in them to be in support of this policy. 
 
Confidence in Supreme Court 
Table 11-Confidence in the Supreme Court 
and Powers 
Variable Chi-Square Sig (α=.05) 
STOPRNDM 6.855 0.334 
TAPPHONE 5.552 0.475 
WOTRIAL 12.594 0.050* 
CCTV 10.363 0.110 
EMONITOR 17.164 0.009* 
GIVINFUSA 6.396 0.380 
GIVINFFOR 12.356 0.054 
 
 When it comes to confidence in the supreme court in relation to these variables, there is 
once again a lack of significance for many of the variables. The only ones with significance are if 
the government should be allowed to monitor people’s emails and if the government should have 
the right to detain suspects of terrorism without trial. (though this one is barely significant). In 
support for detaining people without trial, there is a steady rise in support for this power being 
given to the government as confidence in the supreme court goes down. The opposite is the case 
when it comes to if the government should have the ability to monitor people’s emails, with the 
most support being with the people who have a great deal of confidence in the Supreme Court. 
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The detaining variable having more significance as it goes down makes sense, as detaining 
suspects without trial is directly subverting the court system. It may be that people do not feel 
that the courts will give a verdict they agree with and so it is better to not involve them in that 
decision. The opposite trend being in place for the monitoring of emails may show more that 





















1 (Constant) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age of 
Respondent 
0.575 0.695 0.004* 0.664 0.344 0.026* 0.000* 
Respondents 
sex 
0.969 0.736 0.042* 0.022* 0.117 0.480 0.239 
Race of 
respondent 
0.190 0.165 0.089 0.948 0.643 0.235 0.502 
R's highest 
degree 












0.700 0.646 0.463 0.460 0.182 0.549 0.397 
Confidence in 
military 
0.003* 0.002* 0.000* 0.334 0.099 0.001* 0.002* 
Confid. in 
exec branch 
of fed govt 
0.948 0.610 0.421 0.197 0.086 0.747 0.924 







0.523 0.399 0.036* 0.477 0.130 0.227 0.531 
Confidence in 
congress 
0.902 0.229 0.181 0.123 0.958 0.619 0.978 
Think of self 
as liberal or 
conservative 
0.679 0.597 0.975 0.358 0.092 0.867 0.341 
 
When a multiple regression is run on each of the dependent variables using all of the 
independent variables, there are several independent variables that consistently appear. 
Confidence in the military is the most frequently significant of these variables, having 
significance in five of the seven dependent variables (Tables 12, 13, 14, 17 and 18). 
Additionally, for the variables of stoprndm (Table 12) and tapphone (Table 13) confidence in the 
military is the only variable with significance in the multiple regressions. The other independent 
variables that have multiple appearances of significance are age, degree, and sex. Age (Tables14, 
17, and 18) and degree (Tables 15, 16, 17, and 18) have significance in three variables, 
respectively (wotrial, givinfusa, and givinffor for age; and cctv, emonitor, and givinfusa for 
degree), and sex had significance in two variables: wotrial (Table 14) and cctv (Table 15). The 
dependent variable that had the most independent variables with significance was wotrial (Table 
14) that had four: age, sex, confidence in military, confidence in the Supreme Court. 
 
Discussion 
 There are some conclusions that can be drawn from this examination that were 
unexpected. Firstly, based on the multiple regressions it seems as though political ideology may 
be a confounding variable for something else. Namely that confidence in the military seems to be 
one of the more important factors in determining support for these powers. One such explanation 
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for this may be that many of the police powers would be employed by the military or military-
related organizations. This would mean that people who have more confidence in these 
organizations would be more willing to trust them with these powers. This may also explain why 
trust in other parts of the government lose their significance in the multiple regression. This may 
also help to explain why support for detaining someone without trial as people’s trust in the 
Supreme Court goes down. People who have less trust in the courts may not see the necessity or 
legitimacy of trial anyway and so they believe that detaining without a trial is a power that 
should be granted to another part of the government. 
The importance of degree may be linked to people having a greater understanding of 
some of the wider consequences of policies and this is reflected in their views on the powers that 
the government should be given. This may be why public camera surveillance becomes more 
popular with degree as it is less intrusive than the other variables it is significant within the 
multiple regression, monitoring people’s emails and collecting info on American citizens. Age 
may be attributed to a belief in how serious these policies may be for the objectives they espouse. 
Younger respondents, especially those in the 18-24 range, may not have been as cognizant of the 
impacts of 9/11 at the time it occurred and see these policies and powers as less necessary as a 
result. For Sex, the significance in the cctv variables is more an indication of how strongly males 
and females feel about the issue. Males are more likely to think that the government definitely 
should have the right and probably should not have the right, and females are the inverse. But 
when definitely and probably should are combined, their percentages are virtually the same. The 
same is true for definitely should not and probably should not. For detaining suspects without a 
trial there is a numeric difference in views in addition to a statistical significance. In this, males 
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are less likely to support this than females are. The prior research did not cover why this 
difference may be the case. Further research should be done to shed more light on this finding. 
 It should be addressed that political ideology loses its significance when the multiple 
regression is performed. This may be a sign that political ideology may actually be a 
confounding variable when examining why people believe these powers are necessary. That is to 
say that it may be that instead of being more conservative leading to an increase in support for 
these powers, it may just be that confidence in the military leads to being more conservative as 
well as believing that these powers were necessary.  
 
Conclusion 
 These results show trends for the powers that people believe the government should have 
to pursue terror suspects and for general surveillance. There was not much significance for the 
variables that measure the confidence people had in the three main branches of the federal 
government when compared to if the government should employ these powers, and when there 
was significance some of the policies became more popular as confidence declined. This result 
was fairly unexpected and does not have a ready explanation that can be gleaned from the prior 
research. One possible explanation for this phenomenon may be that people may not see these 
parts of government as being directly responsible for administering these policies and therefore 
do not feel they need to have confidence in them for these policies to be put in place.  
 The analysis that focused on confidence in the military and trust in administrators and 
congresspeople tended to show more significance. This may be because they have more 
perceived importance when it comes to these policies as administrators and the military would be 
the ones likely tasked with carrying out these policies. The trend observed in the data examining 
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people’s political ideologies falls right in line with the trends observed in prior research, with 
more conservative respondents believing that these powers should be granted to the government 
more than liberal respondents.  
 The multiple regression revealed that political ideology may not be as important a 
variable in terms of peoples wanting to grant these powers to the government, and that other 
things such as confidence in the military and degree may be better indicators for what is 
significant in holding these beliefs. Future studies should examine more fully the relationship 
between support for these policies and confidence in the military. Other variables should be 
examined to see what else may hold significance when examined with support for these policies. 
Finally, it may be worthwhile to put the variables for confidence together and examine them 
together to see what would happen if the variables on confidence were indexed together. 
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t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.526 0.400   6.319 0.000 
Age of 
Respondent 
-0.017 0.030 -0.029 -0.561 0.575 
Respondents 
sex 
-0.004 0.105 -0.002 -0.039 0.969 
Race of 
respondent 
0.105 0.080 0.066 1.314 0.190 
R's highest 
degree 












0.024 0.063 0.023 0.385 0.700 
Confidence in 
military 
0.247 0.082 0.152 3.004 0.003 
Confid. in 
exec branch 
of fed govt 





-0.054 0.084 -0.035 -0.639 0.523 
Confidence in 
congress 
0.013 0.105 0.007 0.123 0.902 
Think of self 
as liberal or 
conservative 
-0.015 0.036 -0.021 -0.415 0.679 
a. Dependent Variable: Should authorities have right to search ppl in the street 
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t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.625 0.426   6.159 0.000 
Age of 
Respondent 
-0.013 0.032 -0.020 -0.392 0.695 
Respondents 
sex 
-0.038 0.112 -0.016 -0.338 0.736 
Race of 
respondent 
0.118 0.085 0.070 1.392 0.165 
R's highest 
degree 












0.031 0.068 0.027 0.460 0.646 
Confidence in 
military 
0.273 0.087 0.158 3.124 0.002 
Confid. in 
exec branch 
of fed govt 





-0.076 0.090 -0.046 -0.845 0.399 
Confidence in 
congress 
-0.135 0.112 -0.072 -1.206 0.229 
Think of self 
as liberal or 
conservative 
-0.020 0.038 -0.027 -0.530 0.597 
a. Dependent Variable: Should authorities have right to tap phone Conversation 
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t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.810 0.398   7.069 0.000 
Age of 
Respondent 
-0.086 0.030 -0.142 -2.878 0.004 
Respondents 
sex 
-0.212 0.104 -0.096 -2.041 0.042 
Race of 
respondent 
-0.136 0.080 -0.083 -1.703 0.089 
R's highest 
degree 












-0.046 0.063 -0.042 -0.734 0.463 
Confidence in 
military 
0.342 0.081 0.205 4.205 0.000 
Confid. in 
exec branch 
of fed govt 





-0.175 0.083 -0.112 -2.104 0.036 
Confidence in 
congress 
0.140 0.104 0.076 1.341 0.181 
Think of self 
as liberal or 
conservative 
-0.001 0.036 -0.002 -0.031 0.975 
a. Dependent Variable: Should authorities have right to detain the suspected 
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t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.407 0.371   6.488 0.000 
Age of 
Respondent 
-0.012 0.028 -0.022 -0.435 0.664 
Respondents 
sex 
-0.224 0.097 -0.111 -2.304 0.022 
Race of 
respondent 
0.005 0.074 0.003 0.065 0.948 
R's highest 
degree 












-0.044 0.059 -0.043 -0.740 0.460 
Confidence in 
military 
0.074 0.076 0.048 0.967 0.334 
Confid. in 
exec branch 
of fed govt 





0.056 0.078 0.039 0.711 0.477 
Confidence in 
congress 
0.151 0.098 0.091 1.545 0.123 
Think of self 
as liberal or 
conservative 
-0.030 0.033 -0.046 -0.919 0.358 
a. Dependent Variable: Civil liberties - video surveillance 
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t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 3.422 0.387   8.850 0.000 
Age of 
Respondent 
-0.028 0.029 -0.048 -0.947 0.344 
Respondents 
sex 
-0.159 0.101 -0.076 -1.571 0.117 
Race of 
respondent 
-0.036 0.077 -0.023 -0.464 0.643 
R's highest 
degree 












0.082 0.061 0.078 1.338 0.182 
Confidence in 
military 
0.131 0.079 0.083 1.652 0.099 
Confid. in 
exec branch 
of fed govt 





-0.124 0.081 -0.083 -1.517 0.130 
Confidence in 
congress 
-0.005 0.102 -0.003 -0.052 0.958 
Think of self 
as liberal or 
conservative 
-0.058 0.035 -0.084 -1.688 0.092 
a. Dependent Variable: Civil liberties - monitor emails 
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t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.713 0.392   6.925 0.000 
Age of 
Respondent 
-0.066 0.029 -0.111 -2.230 0.026 
Respondents 
sex 
-0.072 0.103 -0.034 -0.706 0.480 
Race of 
respondent 
-0.093 0.078 -0.059 -1.188 0.235 
R's highest 
degree 












0.037 0.062 0.035 0.599 0.549 
Confidence in 
military 
0.275 0.080 0.169 3.421 0.001 
Confid. in 
exec branch 
of fed govt 





-0.100 0.082 -0.065 -1.210 0.227 
Confidence in 
congress 
0.051 0.103 0.029 0.497 0.619 
Think of self 
as liberal or 
conservative 
-0.006 0.035 -0.008 -0.168 0.867 
a. Dependent Variable: Should govt collect citizen info without knowledge 
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t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 3.273 0.385   8.506 0.000 
Age of 
Respondent 
-0.116 0.029 -0.201 -4.014 0.000 
Respondents 
sex 
0.119 0.101 0.056 1.180 0.239 
Race of 
respondent 
-0.052 0.077 -0.033 -0.672 0.502 
R's highest 
degree 












-0.052 0.061 -0.049 -0.849 0.397 
Confidence in 
military 
0.239 0.079 0.151 3.043 0.002 
Confid. in 
exec branch 
of fed govt 





-0.051 0.081 -0.034 -0.627 0.531 
Confidence in 
congress 
-0.003 0.101 -0.002 -0.027 0.978 
Think of self 
as liberal or 
conservative 
-0.032 0.034 -0.047 -0.954 0.341 
a. Dependent Variable: Should govt collect foreigner info without knowledge 
 
